When the Asian financial crisis broke in mid-1997, the expectation was that Indonesia would weather the crisis with minimal damage. Actual events soon proved these expectations widely wrong and the Indonesian economy was more severely affected than other Asian countries. In part this outcome reflected Indonesia's fundamental institutional weakness that had been overlooked in the euphoria that marked international financial markets during the 1990s, and in part the impact of the financial crisis was magnified by inconsistent internal policies and by an overly ambitious IMF program that tried to achieve too much in to short a period of time. The result was not only a severe economic contraction with rising poverty levels and growing social unrest, but a political change that resulted, in the short-run, in further economic instability and effectively delayed Indonesia's recovery.
assessment of the commonly held belief that the rapidly growing Asian economies were immune to a "Mexican style" economic meltdown. Analysts now began to speculate that if the "Asian miracle" had been oversold then the very large private capital inflows of the previous years were based on unfounded optimism so that the optimistic assessments were suddenly replaced by an increased feeling of skepticism about the health of the Asian economies. As questions began to be raised about the structural soundness of the East Asian economies there was a sudden and dramatic reversal of capital flows as inflows turned into massive capital outflows and banks that were once eager to lend to nearly any Asian investor suddenly refused to renew short-term credit lines.
3 Pressure soon rose against the Malaysian ringgit with Bank Negara Malaysia reportedly spending 12% of its foreign exchange reserves (roughly $4 billion) in a futile attempt to defend the currency. Eventually the ringgit depreciated by 4%.
A similar situation emerged in the Philippines where on July 11 the central bank announced that it could no longer defend the peso and moved to a floating currency regime. The peso quickly lost 12% of its value. The same day Bank Indonesia, hoping to stem the pressure on the rupiah, widened the exchange rate band from 8% to 12%. 4 If further evidence of a change in perceptions was needed it came immediately. Previously, when the band had been widened the result was a rapid inflow of capital, forcing the central exchange rate to the appreciation edge of the band; this time the rupiah depreciated. 3 Soedradjad, referring to an Institute of International Finance estimate, notes that there was a reversal of capital flows in to the five affected Asian economies -Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia -of $105 billion from 1996 to 1997. For Indonesia, the estimated capital inflows in 1996 were about $10 billion while in 1997, primarily in the latter half; there was an outflow in 1997of $12 billion, for a total reversal in capital flows of some $22 billion. See J. Soedradjad Djiwandono (April 2000) "Bank Indonesia and the Recent Crisis," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 36(1) pp. 49. 4 Another lesson from the wave of currency depreciations that swept over Southeast Asia was that the repurchase agreements that had been set up after the Mexican crisis proved inadequate to fend off currency attacks. This reflected the fact that the help expected under the repurchase agreements was too slow to provide instantaneous relief and that some central banks (for example the central bank of the Philippines) possessed inadequate US Treasury securities to cover the foreign exchange required. 5 Morris Goldstein has labeled the phenomenon where the weakness in one country quickly leads to negative outcomes in neighboring countries as the "wake up call" hypothesis. He argues that individual investors who either behave irrationally or refuse to pay the mounting costs associated with acquiring the correct information with which to asses an individual country, proceed to move out of countries that share some characteristics of the crisis country, thus providing a rationale for the contagion affect of the crisis. See Morris Goldstein, The Asian Financial Crisis. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1998. On Friday, July 18 th , the rupiah weakened by 1.3%, falling from Rp 2,477/US$ to Rp 2,510/US$. Worse was to follow. Over the weekend a number of private Indonesian companies, seeking cover for their dollar-denominated debt, purchased foreign exchange on overseas markets, leading to a large overnight shift in the exchange rate and a sharp reaction from domestic participants who, when the onshore markets opened on Monday, suddenly confronted an exchange rate that had moved dramatically against them. By the end of the trading day on Monday, July 21, the rupiah had fallen to a low of Rp 2,670/US$ before closing at Rp 2,506/US$, a loss of almost 6%. Although Bank Indonesia intervened in the market, first by selling dollars forward and then in the spot market, these efforts had little impact on the rupiah's longer-term value. But they did result in a decline of foreign exchange reserves of some 4.6% during July, the first substantial decline in reserves Indonesia experienced in many years. The available data suggest that during the last half July and the first half of August Bank Indonesia spent some $1.5 billion in support of the currency. While the fall in the rupiah's value began to cause difficulties for many part of the real economy and raised difficult macroeconomic policy issues 6 , it had positive outcome: the nominal depreciation returned Indonesia real exchange rate to levels not seen since the late 1980s.
By Wednesday, August 13, the rupiah was trading near the top of the intervention band and given the choice between gambling large amounts of its foreign exchange reserves in an effort to defend the band or raising interest rates to ever-higher levels, with the inevitable damage to the financial sector and the real economy, Bank Indonesia abandoned its long-standing commitment to a crawling peg. On August 14, 1997, the rupiah was set free to find its own rate, the last of the regional currencies to abandon efforts to fix the exchange rate. The move to a floating rate was widely applauded by the international financial community but it proved to be an ineffective step in containing the coming economic and political onslaught.
With the intervention band removed the rupiah, which had been trading in a fairly stable range of Rp 2,580 to Rp 2,620/US$, began to lose value. Trading on the foreign exchange market opened on August 14 th at Rp 2,650/US$ but by the end of day the 6 The impact of the evolving crisis was dramatically brought home by the sudden cessation of nearly all construction activities. Large construction cranes which dotted the Jakarta skyline and which had been active just a few days before, were suddenly frozen and remained unmoved for the next three years.
rupiah had weakened to Rp 2,800/US$. Over the next few days the currency continued to depreciate and on August 19 th crossed what some felt was a psychologically important level, Rp 3,000/US$. Concerned about the abrupt weakening of the rupiah Bank Indonesia took action to drain liquidity from the banking system, raising interest rates sharply.
State-enterprises were instructed to withdraw deposits from commercial banks and deposit such funds in the central bank. 7 The interest rates on one-month SBI certificate (Sertifikates Bank Indonesia) rose from 12% to 30% while the three-month rate rose from 11 to 28%. Between August 19 and 21 the overnight inter-bank rates shot up to over 100%. 8 As expected these steps contracted liquidity and led to a sharp drop in the demand for dollars so that by August 21 the rupiah had recovered to Rp 2,700/US$. ing further evidence that the technocrats were no longer fully in control. And even though in early September the government had announced further economic reforms and deregulation measures, including a commitment to renewed effort to strengthen and enforce bank prudential regulations, the initial announcements were not followed by implementation decrees, providing further evidence that the government was no longer unified on measures needed to stem the impact of the crisis. The markets now realized that the deregulation program would not regain its dynamism any time soon 9 . Analysts began to question whether the government had the political will to carry through on the needed reforms. While no one believed that the reforms would immediately stem the crisis, many argued that proceeding with the reform agenda was an important indicator of Indonesia's commitment to further global integration and a step that help it regain some measure of international confidence and support.
In response to these policy inconsistency at the end of September the rupiah suddenly depreciated by 20% in one week. Indeed during September the rupiah began to weaken more rapidly than the currencies of the other Asian crisis affected economies, as shown in Table 1 . In addition to the already mentioned postponement of major infrastructure projects, there was to be a scaling back of development programs, an extension of the luxury sales tax, and import duties on over 150 items, mainly raw materials and other intermediate goods, were to be reduced effective mid-September.
~ 5 ~ Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, as well as financial support from Singapore, Japan, the United States and other regional economies. The IMF quickly responded and a team was sent to Jakarta to work out the details of a stand-by arrangement.
From IMF to Currency Board.
At the beginning of November the IMF announced agreement on a standby agreement that included a $23 billion financial package identified by Managing Director Michel Camdessus as a "first line of defense." There was also a so-called "second line of defense" although uncertainty surrounded its actually size and the conditions under which it could be tapped. 10 When, even after the intervention by the IMF, the currency continued to weaken and economic activities began to contract sharply, this program became the subject numerous reviews and critiques. But that was still to come. Initially the program seemed to offer some relief. On Monday, November 3, the first working day after the announcement of the IMF agreement, the rupiah appreciate by almost 10%. In fact this improvement was mainly on the basis of a well-coordinated intervention by the central banks of Indonesia, Japan and Singapore and this initial success proved ephemeral. In retrospect it appears that the financial markets had concluded that the actual size of the program was insufficient to stabilize the exchange rate and there was considerable skepticism whether there was sufficient political support to effectively implement the IMF program.
The question of whether the government would, and indeed could, effectively implement some of the measures called for in the agreement was soon put to the test when the central bank moved to close 16 banks. That there were many weak banks, whose balance sheets had been further weakened by the onset of the financial crisis, was no secret so 10 There was in fact considerable confusion about the actual size of the IMF's package. First, the package counted some $5 billion of Indonesia's own reserves that were supposedly set aside in support of the program. The so-called "second line" facilities, which included contributions from Japan, Singapore, the USA, Malaysia and Australia, were estimated to total some $15 billion although in some reports this was given as a larger amount. Cf. J. Soedradjad Djiwandono (1998 that it was no surprise that a number of banks were to be closed. 11 In light of subsequent developments it should also be noted that even before the bank closures were announced there had been a flight to safety, with many depositors taking their money from private banks and placing them in state-banks that were perceived to be safe, even if they were no better managed. But the press discussion about the likelihood that a fairly large number of banks might be closed had two unintended and highly negative consequence.
Some analysts now argued that since only 16 banks were closed, the IMF had in fact caved in to the political power of the crony capitalists who, together with the President's children, had managed to protect the many other weak banks in which they had significant stakes. 12 Other analysts pointed out that since only 16 banks were closed there would be a second wave of bank closures. 13 The result was that depositors were not persuaded either that the government would now enforce prudential regulations or that the banking system was safe. In fact Cole and Slade argue that this action led to the "… un- 11 Various newspapers published supposedly "authentic" lists of so-called "problem banks," fueling public anxiety, with some going so far as to suggest that close to half of all banks would be shut. 12 The fact that a son of the President owned one of the 16 banks (Bank Andromeda) and that another was owned by the President's half brother did little to reassure the markets about the seriousness of this action. 13 The first standby specifically mentions that "…10 Whatever ones final reading on the decision on the initial bank closures, it should be noted that Bank Indonesia and its staff managed this step with reasonable efficiency.
In parallel with the announced closure of the 16 banks, the government promised that all small depositors, those holding Rp. 20 million or less, would be fully compensated and some 800,000 small depositors were in fact quickly paid off. 16 Perhaps more important, in light of later developments in the banking crisis, the government did not guarantee repayment but asked Bank Indonesia to use its own funds to pay out the small depositors with an advance that the government would finance until it could establish a deposit insurance scheme.
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The crisis now entered a new stage. As the rupiah continued to weaken deposits fled from banks perceived to be weak to safer havens -either by converting rupiah into dollars or by shifting deposits to foreign owned banks or to the state-banks. 18 The result was that an increasing number of private domestic banks began to face severe liquidity problems. In August reserves held by commercial banks with Bank Indonesia fell from Rp 11.9 trillion to Rp 4 trillion although the estimated required reserves were around Rp 12.5 trillion. During September commercial banks managed to raise their reserve levels but they did so largely by borrowing from a special discount window that Bank Indonesia had activated. By September Bank Danamon and BDNI, two of the largest private banks, had already lost half of their dollar deposits and the use of liquidity reserves was increasing. It was during August and September that Bank Indonesia began to accommodate banks whose reserves had fallen below their required levels by allowing them to continue to participate in the daily clearing, effectively providing some measure of liquidity support. And the President managed to further cloud the situation by announcing, shortly 16 Small depositors had to wait about two weeks to be fully paid off while other depositors had to wait till the banks were liquidated and all tax obligations settled before they would be paid off. 17 The first standby agreement stated that "…once the situation stabilizes and the banking system is on sounder footing, Bank Indonesia will institute a formal deposit insurance scheme covering private and public banks." Par. 49, p. 18. International Monetary Fund, Indonesia: Request for a Stand-by Arrangement.
October 31, 1997. 18 At one time Bank Indonesia nearly ran out of currency but managed to meet demand by locating a number of boxes held in storage that contained commemorative Rp 50,000 bank notes that had been printed for Indonesia's fiftieth independence day in 1995.
before leaving for an overseas trip, that the government would not close any more banks in the future.
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Given this policy signal, Bank Indonesia felt it had no choice but to increase the amount of liquidity support to illiquid banks, further loosening its monetary controls as it tried to prevent a widespread collapse of the banking system. The result was a rapid rise in liquidity support, which rose sharply throughout the last quarter of 1997 and continued to rise well into 1998, as shown in Figure 1 . The liquidity support funds, provided with few or no controls, fueled an ever-larger demand for dollars, further weakening the currency and leading to an even larger demand by banks for liquidity support. The sharp increase in liquidity resulted in a deterioration of the macroeconomic situation and worsened the increasingly acrimonious debate between the government and the IMF about how to contain the crisis. 
Rupiah Trillions Bank Indonesia data, various documents.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, two questions have been raised. First, what justification was there for Bank Indonesia to provide such large-scale liquidity support? Second, was the closing of the 16 banks a "mistake" that in effect set of the bank run and worsened, rather than helped ameliorate, the crisis? The extent to which Bank Indonesia was forced by political pressures to rescue potentially failing banks without raising to many questions is an issue that remains unclear. Even if one cannot provide a definitive answer it seems reasonable to conclude that the use of liquidity funds, which undoubtedly contributed to the ongoing pressure on the rupiah, had to be provided given the President's implicit instructions that he did not want more banks to be closed, at least in the near term. Yet even if one recognizes the difficult situation created for Bank Indonesia management by the President's stand, it may be correct, as some allege, that Bank Indonesia management violated its own regulations by issuing liquidity support without adequate safeguards in terms of receiving access to high quality assets and charging high what economic and social impact will not be easily resolved.
In trying to understand Indonesia's eventual economic collapse, some have noted that in moments of severe crisis, when there is a daily prospect of a widespread systemic bank failure, there is little time to seek policy clarification and explore alternative policy 20 Soedradjad Djiwandono, "Controversial Issues." Unpublished manuscript. 21 The Indonesian term for these liquidity support measures is Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia, or BLBI. 22 The government initially refused to cover the BLBI losses, a move that threatened to bankrupt Bank Indonesia. In November 2000 the Finance Ministry and Bank Indonesia eventually reached an agreement under which the bank would only have to cover Rp 24 trillion, while the government's Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) would assume responsibility for the remainder.
approaches. Moreover, it also needs to be noted that Indonesia's banking crisis and economic meltdown played itself out against a growing unease with the political and economic situation. In the face of the determined effort by the ruling party to retain its hold on political power and provide continued economic protection not only to the immediate family members but also to the crony capitalist it is unlikely that any effort at stabilizing the economy, no matter how well executed, would have been successful.
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In fact it now became common in Indonesia to vacillate on economic matters. On
November 8 President Soeharto issued a decree allowing the implementation of the 15 projects previously put under review or postponed, a move that was widely perceived as a significant back tracking from earlier commitments. Other contradictory statements and decrees raised further concern that there was no clear economic view on how to deal with the crisis. In this light it is probably fair to conclude that while the closing of 16 banks may not have been well thought out or well implemented it was not the only cause, or perhaps even the major cause, of the subsequent collapse of confidence in the banking system.
In mid-November came the news that the Korea won was also under severe pressure. The realization that even Korea, a newly admitted member to the OECD and one of the original "Asian miracle economies," might not weather the crisis unscathed further fueled the financial panic. On November 15, Seoul was forced to stop foreign exchange trading for the third consecutive day when, half an hour after the trading day began, the won reached its allowed limits for daily fluctuations. Korea, following on the heels of Thailand and Indonesia, quickly turned to the IMF for assistance. The realization that Korea too could not withstand the onslaught of the financial crisis raised the level of panic among investors throughout Asia.
Adding to this mix, rumors began to emerge in early December that the President Soeharto was in poor health. After completing a trip to South Africa, followed by a visit 23 Consider for example that Thailand not only changed government during this period but also adopted a new constitution, a process that admittedly was underway before the crisis broke, while Korea held its scheduled elections soon after the crisis reached its shores, and affected a change in government. These changes in government leadership may have been coming in any event but they gave the impression that in both countries there was now a new government ostensibly committed to reforms and better economic management. No such change in government took place in Indonesia nor was any regime change anticipated.
to Canada to attend the annual APEC meeting, with a return journey that involved a brief visit to Saudi Arabia, doctors told Soeharto that he had to take ten days of rest. This, given the President's age, was perhaps not totally surprising, but when the President was also forced, at the advise of his medical team, to cancel a planned trip to Iran, where he was scheduled to attend a meeting of the Organization of Islamic Conference, concerns deepened. Even more disturbing was the news that the President would also cancel his trip to Kuala Lumpur, where he was to attend an ASEAN meeting, a trip that required only a short ninety-minute flight. All of these events contributed to the continued slide of the rupiah which fell to Rp. 5,015/US$ on December 12 while the Jakarta stock market closed at a four year low.
At the end of December the government announced that by mid 1998 four stateowned banks (Bank Dagan Negara, Bank Bumi Daya, Bapindo and Bank Ekspor Impor)
would be merged, in line with its commitment under the IMF's Letter of Intent. At the same time the Minister of Trade and Industry announced a ban on the exports of crude palm oil, which was to remain in, place least through the first quarter of 1998. This measure was taken in response to the sharp rise in domestic prices as palm oil producers shifted from meeting the needs of the domestic market to exploiting the higher prices now available on the international markets. While the Minister's concern about rising domestic palm oil prices, especially as the end of year festivities gathered force, was understandable, it again raised the question of Indonesia's commitment to increasing the scope for market determined economic outcomes. Yet despite the various pieces of negative news -including the severe and largely unchecked forest fires that caused considerable friction between Indonesia and its neighbors, all of whom were affected by the heavy smoke pollution, as well as the persistent drought which severely eroded agriculture output throughout the region -the year ended with the currency strengthening to Rp.
4,800/US$. This good news however did not reflect market sentiment but was the result of substantial intervention in the foreign exchange markets by Bank Indonesia, which wanted to create a reasonably strong exchange rate for companies that closed their books at the end of the calendar year. Not surprising then that on January 2, 1998, the first trading day of the New Year, the rupiah resumed its downward slide, falling to Rp.
6,200/US$.
~ 12 ~ On January 6 th , the government announced its 1998/99 -draft budget which was based on assumptions that were quickly derided as unrealistic and in violation of the IMF agreements. 24 The result was a further loss of international confidence in the government leading to another significant weakening of the rupiah, which reached Rp. 8,100/US$ on January 7, bringing the cumulative depreciation since the onset of the crisis in July to 70 percent -by far the largest depreciation among the affected Asian economies. On January 15, 1998 a second IMF package was announced. In response to the growing concern by the IMF shareholders that Indonesia failed to live up to is commitments under the earlier agreements, the January letter of intent provided a detailed item by item deadline for the implementation of numerous policy reforms, including the commitment to "…adjust administered prices with the aim of gradually eliminating subsidies on fuel and electricity." 25 Eventually it was the President's decision to meet this specific target that ignited the disturbances, which brought about a change in government.
Although much of the period since the signing of the first IMF agreement had been marked by policy inconsistencies the government finally undertook a series of step intended to restore some measure of economic calm. On January 26 the Indonesia Bank Reconstruction Agency (IBRA) was established and assigned the task of taking over and managing insolvent banks. At the same time, in a somewhat surprising step, the government announced a 100% deposit guarantee scheme covering all bank liabilities including inter-bank debt and debt to foreign banks. The decision to provide a 100% deposit guarantee scheme not only created a potential future moral hazard but also sharply increased government liabilities since the government now assumed the cost of the bank recapitalization efforts. 26 The immediate impact however was to stem the bank runs and restore some measure of confidence in the local currency.
27 24 The draft budget assumed revenue and expenditure growth of 31.1% over the previous budget, widely perceived as breaking the IMF targets, while GDP growth was set at 4.1% with inflation projected to below 10% for the year despite the already massive depreciation of the currency and the widespread havoc this had already caused to the real sector. 25 The process of eliminating fuel subsidies "…while protecting the poor" was to start on April 1, 1998 but was to run the course over the program. IMF. 10,000/US$. On Wednesday, January 28, 1998, the last day before the onset of the major holiday marking the end of the month long Ramadan fast, the rupiah traded at Rp.
11,150/US$ although offshore trading saw the rupiah weaken to a record Rp. 12,050/ US$. But surprisingly, on Monday, February 2, when onshore trading resumed, the rupiah opened stronger and gained strength throughout the day, ending at Rp.
10,550/US$, up 5.4% from the offshore low. Although the currencies of all the Asian economies affected by the crisis strengthen at this time in retrospect it seems that rumors about an impending move by Indonesia to adopt a currency board had already begun to seep into the markets and propped up the rupiah.
The emergence of the currency board as an alternative way of resolving the currency crisis now added a further complication to efforts to stabilize the economic situation and further damaged Indonesia's fading reputation for careful economic management. At the end of January, Professor Steve Hanke, a strong and vocal proponent of currency boards, arrived in Jakarta. Meetings were quickly arranged with the President and the senior economic ministers as well as with the Governor of Bank Indonesia and try Annexes. April 11, 2003, p. 30-31] but whether the IMF's recommendation was meant to be as broad as the policy eventually put into place is unclear. 27 The economic crisis resulted in a major realignment in Indonesia's banking system. In June 1997, at the onset of the crisis, there were 237 banks; three years later this had shrunk to 161. not, adopt a currency board. As Indonesia seemed to veer ever closer to the adoption of a currency board, the rupiah strengthened, at one point trading at around Rp. 7,000/US$.
But this was less a vote of confidence in Indonesia's ability to effectively implement a currency board then speculative movements by foreign exchange traders who stood to make enormous profits if Indonesia moved to a currency board regime and set the exchange rate at a rate stronger than the prevailing market rate.
In fact there never was any public statement about what exchange rate might be adopted although there was ample speculation that an exchange rate of Rp. 5,000/US$ was under consideration. Most likely the assumption that the currency board would settle on a rate close to Rp. 5,000/US$ reflected two related rumors. First, there was a belief that many of the corporations now reeling under the debt burden that the collapse of the rupiah imposed, could survive at an exchange rate of about Rp. 5,000/US$, which was linked with the second rumor that Professor Hanke's visit had been facilitated by these very same industrialists. Given these assumptions it was easy to conclude that the rate to be adopted would be one that might save the tottering industrial empires of the President's children and the crony capitalists. 30 However a number of analysts pointed out that pegging the currency at anything approaching that rate was no longer feasible and But despite this temporary respite the crisis was now set to enter its final stage.
As inflation had gathered speed and as economic activities, especially construction, had ground to a halt, social unrest had spread. In early February 1998, mobs attacked shops, many owned by ethnic Chinese, in a number of the provinces, including the island of Java. These attacks not only disrupted the distribution system, as trucking firms became reluctant to move goods into the riot-affected areas, but the racial tone of the riots probably led to further capital flight on the part of the ethnic Chinese minority. It was with this background in mind that the monthly economic report, while noting the improvement in the general macroeconomic situation, expressed concerns that the government's com-mitment to eliminating energy subsidies in one step would not only reignite inflation but could further undermine social stability. The report strongly urged the government to consider eliminating all fuel subsidies slowly over an extended period of time. 35 That advice was not heeded.
Indonesia, like many oil-exporting countries, had long struggled with the appropriate price for its domestic energy users and energy price controls were a major part of the government's long-standing economic and social policy stance. The government justified its pricing system by noting that the subsidy on kerosene was an important poverty alleviation tool even though numerous studies suggested otherwise. In fact the share of expenditure on kerosene by the poorest segment of the population was rather small and the subsidy was a particularly inefficient poverty alleviation tool because of the substantial leakage of kerosene not only to various transport activities, notably to diesel powered mini-buses and other diesel-powered machines, but also to offshore users. 36 More difficult to justify was the fiscal subsidy provided to gasoline users, most of them in the upper income classes, although the extent of the subsidy varied as international prices fluctuated while the domestic price remained fixed.
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Given the commitment made to the IMF to eliminate the long-standing energy subsidies, numerous studies now began to look at the likely impact of such a move on the Hence it was suggested that the fuel subsidies be eliminated through a more staggered approach. Admittedly reducing the subsidy over a period of a year, as was presumably permitted under the terms of the IMF agreement (see above), would be costly to the government budget even if it would reduce the inflationary spurt to be expected from a sudden elimination of all subsidies on energy.
On May 4, 1998, the government announced that energy prices would rise the following day. At one end of the product spectrum, gasoline prices were set to increase by some 71% while kerosene would see its price rise by 25%. The basic electricity tariff would also be raised by some 20% with the added warning that further price increases would come later in the year. While government had raised energy prices in years past, often by substantial amounts, the decisions to increase energy prices so dramatically and so soon after the onset of the economic crisis was bound to raise concerns. Indeed the President was warned by members of the Cabinet and by senior army officers that the sudden increase in energy prices, following upon the turmoil caused by the depreciation of the rupiah and the rising unpopularity of the political regime, could lead to further demonstrations which the military might not be able to control. They all urged the president to postpone the fuel price adjustment for the time being. But the President rejected this advice indicating that the government had just raised the floor price for rice, an obviously popular move among parts of the rural populace. This he believed would cushion the negative impact of the energy price increase, as it had done in the past. Unfortunately this time events proved him wrong.
Student demonstrations had been increasing for some time. Security forces had let it be known informally that they would tolerate such activities as long as the demonstrations were restricted to the university campuses. But the demonstrations now became 38 Simon Kandel and Joseph J. Stern, "Proposed BBM Price Adjustment." Memorandum 905/97/827. Economic Analysis Project, Ministry of Finance, Jakarta, Indonesia. 39 Ibid. It should be noted that when the standby agreement was under negotiation it seemed reasonable to assume that the exchange rate would stabilize around Rp.3,500/US$. That assumption was no longer tenable by the end of the year when measures were under discussion to meet the IMF goal on fuel prices. But what was less readily appreciated was the difference between legislating reform and actually changing societal behavior. That is a much longer and more complex process that is still ongoing.
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The Asian crisis took a severe toll on the Indonesian economy. As shown in Table 3, Indonesia's economy shrank more than that of any of the other Asian affected economies while its recovery from the depth of the crisis has been the slowest. The economic crisis also sharply raised poverty levels despite the considerable efforts by the Indonesian government and the World Bank to create an effective and wellfunded social safety net. As the methodology used to measure poverty changed after 1996, it is no longer possible to make direct comparisons to pre-crisis observations. One can only note that at the height of the crisis, in 1998, nearly a quarter of the population was counted as falling below the poverty line, a level of poverty last seen in 1981, although it must be emphasized again that these direct comparisons are at best indicative of changes in the poverty situation. As the economy began to recover the measured level of urban poverty began to decline and by 2001 had seemingly fallen to roughly pre-crisis levels although rural poverty levels remain high.
The sudden and severe collapse of the Indonesian economy, which had been held up as a model of successful economic reform raised the obvious question whether the collapse was truly a reflection of internal weaknesses, some of which may have been overlooked in the euphoria of the period of rapid growth, or whether the policy prescriptions recommended by the Fund and its supporters turned a possibly minor economic downturn into a major economic and political debacle. Critics of the IMF have focused on the initial standby agreement, which, it is argued, put into place a set of policies that contributed to the economic downturn. Although the stand-by agreement covered many specific ~ 23 ~ items four broad issues are common elements in most of the criticism leveled at the IMF.
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First, the IMF forced the government to confront the weaknesses of the financial sector by closing 16 banks and commit itself to longer-term program of closing additional banks, merge the existing state banks, and strengthen the institutional, legal and regulatory framework for the financial system as a whole; Second, monetary policy was to be tightened to help stabilize the rupiah; Third fiscal policy was to achieve a public sector surplus of about 1% of GDP in both 1997/98 and 1998/99. This would be brought about by reducing or eliminating numerous subsidies including adjustments in the administered prices for electricity and fuel; and Fourth, numerous domestic monopolies were to be eliminated.
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Moreover, critics have also noted that many of the elements of the initial stand-by mirrored stabilization programs carried out by the IMF in different settings where the causes of the economic collapse were different from the Asian crisis and where these policy prescriptions may well have had some rationale. This argument claims that the IMF failed to understand the true cause of the Asian crisis, and especially as it played out in Indonesia, and simply used a standard set of tools to try and treat a vastly different economic problem. To some extent the IMF did use a standard set of analytic insights to help deal with the crisis but whether they were truly inappropriate for the Indonesian situation is more difficult to assess. A partial answer is found in addressing the four specific criticisms identified above. is not nearly as strong as it has been made out.
Third, the recommendation that Indonesia adopt a more restrictive fiscal policy, aiming for a public sector budget surplus, is indeed more difficult to understand. Critics of the IMF argue that this position failed to recognize that Indonesia, like many of the other East Asian economies, had generally followed prudent fiscal policy and that large budget deficits were not, by any stretch of the imagination, a primary cause of the economic crisis. Before the onset of the crisis Indonesia had garnered a well-earned reputation for financial prudence based on its concept of a "balanced budget" so that in 1996 Indonesia had one of lowest ratios of government debt to GDP in the world, ranking below Switzerland and Norway. Admittedly this generally sound fiscal stand hid two problems. First, the government has increasingly used so-called off-budget expenditures to fund a number of activities, many of which, such as the development of a jet-plane, had very low economic returns. Moreover, despite the tax reforms carried out in the 1980s, which had introduced a modern tax system, there had been relatively little progress in raising tax revenues, closing loopholes, eliminating corruption in the tax offices, and raising the efficiency of government investments. Improvements in all of these areas were certainly 47 Laporan Bulanan Makroekonomi (Monthly Economic Report). Prepared by the Economic Analysis Unit, Ministry of Finance. April 1998, pp. 8, 12, and 18. worthwhile goals but whether they needed to be addressed at the onset of a major currency crisis is questionable. Indeed a strong case could be made that as the currency crisis began to affect the real economy, causing layoffs and reductions in real incomes and a reduction in tax revenues, government needed to raise expenditures on a variety of social safety net programs even as revenues fell off. And over time the IMF changed its focus, insisting less on the attainment of specific budget surplus targets and more on creating a long-term viable fiscal base. For example, the performance review carried out in July 1998 focused on "…efforts to eliminate the fiscal deficit over the medium-term…" and looked for steps to "…improving budgetary revenue performance and expenditure management."
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In order to reach the target budget surplus the IMF wanted a reduction or elimination of numerous subsidies including adjustments in the administered prices for electricity and fuel. 49 Eliminating the numerous monopolies that had been established, mainly to benefit either members of the Soeharto family directly (such as the clove and citrus monopoly) or which created rents for other favored regime supporters (such as the monopoly on garlic and wheat imports and the controls on sugar imports) was a worthy goal. But once again one can question whether these issues had much to do with the immediate cause of the economic crisis and with the need to return some measure of stability to the economy. "Although they were not entirely to blame, the IMF and the U.S. government demanded immediate and radical reforms in Indonesia during its 1998 crisis, thereby helping to delegitimize and topple the government. Had they recognized the political instability these reforms would produce, they might have moderated their demands and made do with a more incremental approach. Soeharto was running a flawed regime, but one that had achieved order, secularism, and economic liberalization -an impressive combination in the Third World. Most important, nothing better was available to replace it. Gradual political reform rather than wholesale revolution would have been preferable, certainly for the average Indonesian, who one assumes was the intended beneficiary of Western policies." 
